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SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES -
CHALLENGES TO SOVEREIGNTY - A CANADIAN
PERSPECTIVE
Lawrence L. Herman
I. INTRODUCTION
Until the latter part of this century and the advent of the NAFTA, the
annals of Canada-U.S. dispute settlement were surprisingly thin. There were
some well-known arbitrations that dealt with important sovereignty-type
issues, such as the Alaska Boundary Commission award,' the I'm Alone arbi-
tration,2 the Trail Smelter arbitration,3 the Gulf of Maine case,4 and a few
notable others. But there is surprisingly little case law involving Canada-U.S.
disputes until we get into the modem era of trade relations.
The lack of instances of third-party settlement reflects the fact that, in
much of the Canada-U.S. relationship, dispute resolution was based on good
offices and effective diplomacy. Yet from Canada's perspective, the lack of
firm rules for settling disputes legally was a cause for some disquietude. Al-
ways the smaller partner, Canada had the most to lose by being at the mercy
of power politics and sheer economic power to determine the outcome of any
particular difference. This concern for a rules-based relationship was one of
the motivating forces that led to the Canadian proposals for a free trade
agreement with the United States in the early 1980s - to enter into a legally
binding contract where the substantive and procedural rules are laid down
and where a properly constructed legal mechanism could ensure the fair,
expeditious, and binding resolution of differences. The United States may not
have shared the same anxieties as Canada, but the notion of a bilateral dis-
pute settlement regime for dealing with trade disputes struck a responsive
chord in the Reagan and Bush administrations.
* Lawrence Herman is Associate Counsel at the law firm of Cassels, Brock &
Blackwell, specializing in international trade and international business transactions. He
holds a B.A. and and LL.B. from the University of Toronto and is a member of the
Saskatchewan and Ontario bars.
I (G.B. v. U.S.) (1903), 15 R.IA.A. 481.
2 (Canada v. U.S.) (1933), 3 R.I.A.A. 1609; (1935) 29 A.J.I.L. 326.
3 United States v. Canada, Arbitral Tribunal, Montreal, Apr. 16, 1938 and Mar. 11, 1941;
U.N. REP. OF INT'L ARBrITAL AWARDS 3 (1947) 1905.
4 [1984] 
.CJ. Rep. 246.
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While consummation of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
was fraught with many difficulties along the way, the main ingredients for
bilateral State-to-State dispute settlement were quite readily agreed to by
both governments.5 In essence, the FTA reflected the laudable parts of the
GATT process and was built on common goals, the belief in the rule of law,
and the need for certainty in commercial, economic, and human relations.
Notwithstanding controversy in the Chapter 19 process for private trade
remedies, Canada and the United States had little difficulty constructing the
FTA dispute settlement mechanism for State-to-State disputes, which was
6
subsequently incorporated into the NAFTA.
That new system was also born from a general dissatisfaction with much
of the old GATT process, which lacked clear rules of procedure and relied
heavily on consensus as the primary value. There were some improvements
effected in the Tokyo Round and in the 1979 Codes, but that system was
coming under increasing criticism by the mid-1980s as the FTA negotiations
were underway. Ultimately, the GATT consensus-based system was radically
changed by the Uruguay Round, which neared completion at about the same
time as the Canada-United States-Mexico negotiations on the NAFTA re-
gime were being settled. The Uruguay Round system alters the consensus-
based approach of the GATT and replaces it with a mechanism that, in broad
strokes, is very much akin to that contained in the FTA and the NAFTA.
The issue for discussion here is the effect that dispute settlement in the
international arena has on the sovereignty of States, with particular reference
to the new mechanisms in the WTO Agreement and the NAFTA. Of course,
in the broad sense, neither treaty affects or limits sovereignty, if that term is
used to mean the right to exercise the range of State functions within defined
geographic boundaries, to the exclusion of any other State.
7
Viewed in traditional public international law terms, adherence to these
international treaties is, by its very nature, an affirmation of sovereignty and
not a denial or limitation of it. On the other hand, there is no doubt that, as
treaty parties, the contracting States have accepted international obligations
that bind them contractually and thus affect their traditional freedom of ac-
tion. In important respects, the WTO dispute process has left little room for
5 The so-called private party track, under FTA Chapter 19, in cases of determinations of
dumping and/or subsidization and of injury by national trade remedy agencies, however, was
more controversial. That controversy continues today, as will be noted below.
6 The objectives in Article 102 of the NAFrA make it clear that the treaty is based on the
rule of law and the common objective of establishing a legal framework to settle disputes.
There are many, many articles written on the FTA and NAFTA dispute settlement
mechanisms. For a good overview, see Jeffrey P. Bialos & Deborah E. Siegel, Dispute
Resolution Under the NAFTA: The Newer and Improved Model, 27 INT'L LAW. 603 (1993).
7 See Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. U.S.) (1928), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 at 83 8-39.
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national governments to manoeuver, as we shall see. It is this aspect of dis-
pute settlement that this Article addresses. 8
This Article also looks at a different but related issue: the relationship
between investor-State dispute settlement and sovereignty. Under NAFTA
Chapter 11, investors from a NAFTA Party can bring binding arbitration
proceedings against another Party directly, claiming that such Party has
breached its obligations under that Chapter. The disputing investor can sub-
mit the claim under the provisions of the International Convention for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes9 (including the ICSID Additional Facility)
or under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules. An arbitration award is enforceable in the
territory of the NAFTA member to the same extent as a court judgment.10
The NAFTA investor-State provisions were seen as useful and progres-
sive, providing a rare case in public international law where persons were
given direct access to dispute settlement and entitled to claim directly against
States for failure to live up to treaty obligations.
This whole area of the law remained quiescent over the years, but has
recently come to the fore in the recent controversies surrounding the negotia-
tion of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) among Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members. Perhaps
more than any other issue, the proposals for settling investment disputes in
the draft MAI - modeled after Chapter 11 of the NAFTA - have raised the
concerns over the limitations this system implies on States' sovereignty.
II. "LEGALIZATION" OF DISPUTE SETrLEMENT AND ITS EFFECT ON
SOVEREIGNTY
The purposes of the WTO and NAFTA regimes are to reform the GATT
system, weed out the consensus-based political aspects of it, and "legalize"
dispute resolution in a highly refined (at least for an international treaty) ju-
dicial process. A carefully crafted and fully transparent regime of conflict
a This Article does not directly address the issues raised in the U.S. courts by a group
called the American Coalition for Competitive Trade, challenging U.S. adherence to the
binational panel process under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA on the grounds that it
unconstitutionally limits the sovereign powers of the Congress and subjects U.S. persons to
non-U.S. judges in NAFTA panels. The Coalitions constitutional challenge was dismissed by
the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, on Nov. 14, 1997: American Coalition for
Competitive Trade Inc. v. Clinton, CADC, No. 97-10036, Nov. 14, 1997. The Court said that
the petitioner failed to prove standing, leaving the doors open on a further constitutional
challenge. See Court Dismisses Constitutional Challenge to NAFTA's Binational Panel
System, 14 INT'LTRADE REP. 2000 (Nov. 19, 1997).
9 Done at Washington, Mar. 18, 1965, Vol. 575 U.N.T.S. 160 (No. 8359 (1966)).
10 NAFTA, art. 1136.
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adjudication through the new Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)11 is
the result. This exposes national legislation to a procedure that is both auto-
matic and non-avoidable, as well as a seriously improved examination proc-
ess by impartial legal experts to determine its consistency with the treaty
regimes.
This degree of examination of State measures, arguably, is unparalleled
in the vast history of international relations. Combined with the DSU's re-
verse consensus rule, it has in turn limited the freedom of WTO members to
legislate as freely as they wish and, in this sense, has resulted in a diminution
of sovereignty. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but the ramifications are
only now being felt by national governments.
The changes under the new system are apparent in two respects. First,
there is now a vast number of cases on the WTO roster, over 100 active files
at latest count. 2 It can be expected that use by WTO members of this more
user-friendly system will continue. This is to be compared with the far
smaller number of cases per year during the former GATT era, when, for
example, many developing countries stayed out of the process or only en-
tered it as intervenors and not as the chief protagonists. Illustrating this is the
fact that, for the 1960s and 1970s, the GATT annals contain relatively few
adopted panel reports. Even in the 1980s, the number of reported GATT
cases was comparatively limited, as opposed to the charged agenda in the
barely three years since the WTO Agreement came into force.1
3
Not only were there a comparatively small number of cases in the pre-
Uruguay Round era, but the degree of detail of examination of national
measures and the extent of analysis in many of the panel reports was often
meagre. Some of the later GATT panel reports of the 1980s and early 1990s
may run to several hundred paragraphs, but many of these simply repeat in
detail the various arguments advanced by the Parties (a hallmark of GATT
panel findings), offering relatively little analysis in the findings portions.
It is instructive to examine these panel reports of the 1960s and 1970s -
even into the early 1980s - to recognize the broad-brush treatment given to
complaints. The thickness (or lack thereof) of the volumes in the GATT Ba-
ll Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Legal Texts, 404 WTO
(1995).
12 See Overview of State-of-play of WTO Disputes, <http:www.wto.org/wto/dispute/
bulletin.htm> (visited Feb. 13, 1998) (displaying a detailed review of current cases and their
status). These include 119 consultation requests on 84 distinct matters, 18 active cases, 9
completed cases, and 22 settled disputes.
In 1977-78, the year before the end of the Tokyo Round, there were only three adopted
panel reports: (1977-78) 25S B.I.S.D. In 1982-83, after implementation of the Codes and other
Uruguay Round changes, there were still only three adopted reports: (1982-83) 30S B.IS.D.
Vol. 24.121 1998
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sic Instruments tells its tale. Take the case of the U.S. complaint against EEC
minimum import prices in 1978.'4 That case involved an extremely complex
regime of minimum import prices administered by the former EEC under its
Common Agricultural Policy, where some fundamental GATT obligations
were at issue. The entire panel report, however, is only forty pages long, and
only twelve pages (a mere twenty paragraphs) are devoted to analysis.
This somewhat cursory treatment began to change in the latter days of the
GATT, in the late 1980s, when national measures began to be assessed more15
scrupulously by panels. This was aided, in part, by more extensive prepara-
tion and more detailed argument by the protagonist governments. However,
not all panels approached their task with the same thoroughness and attention
to detail.
In the first of the series of cases involving Canada's liquor boards in
1988,16 there are ninety-six background paragraphs repeating the various
arguments of the parties, followed by thirty-five paragraphs of analysis. Con-
sidering that the complaint of the E.U. involved the details of operation of no
less than ten provincial liquor board agencies, this degree of scrutiny seems
somewhat thin. However, even here, the panel goes into greater detail in
looking at Canada's internal laws and practices than some of the predecessor
panels had done.
A few years later, there were two liquor board cases directly involving
Canada and the United States, 17 and there is the same repetition of the vari-
ous arguments, extending over many pages. However, in the findings por-
tions, the panels engage in a much more thorough assessment of the im-
pugned measures in relation to GATT obligations, reflecting the greater de-
gree of preparation of the contending governments and the growing trend to
greater depth of analysis by the panels themselves.
By the time we reached the Uruguay Round and the WTO DSU, the stage
had been set. The Uruguay Round has caried forward this trend to more in-
depth analysis by panels. Part of this is due to more extensive preparation of
14 EEC -Programme of Minimum Import Prices, License and Surety Deposits for Certain
Processed Fruit and Vegetables, (1977-78) 25S B.LS.D. 68 (Panel report adopted Oct. 18,
1978) [hereinafter Import Prices].
Even in the important case of United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
(1988-89) 36S B.LS.D. 345, the report covers 40 pages, only 14 of which actually analyze the
measure concerned. This does not mean that these reports are to be assessed on a counting of
pages or paragraphs of analysis. However, it does allow parallels to be drawn between the old
GATT approach and dispute settlement in the WTO era.
16 Canada - Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian Provincial
Marketing Agencies, (1987-88) 35S B.LS.D. 37 (Panel report adopted Mar. 22, 1988).
17 Canada - Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial
Marketing Agencies (1991-92), 39S B.LS.D. 27; United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic
and Malt Beverages (1991-92), 39S B.LS.D. 206.
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written submissions and argument by legal counsel of the protagonist states.
This, in turn, subjects governments to international scrutiny to a degree not
approached in the earlier days of the GATT regime. States whose measures
are under the lamp are made to seriously squirm before the WTO panels.
A case in point is to compare the 1997 Appellate Body report on EC Beef
Hormones with the 1978 EEC Import Prices panel report referred to ear-
lier. The Appellate Body report is 100 pages long, consisting of 255 para-
graphs of detailed analysis. In terms of scrutiny of the measure at issue, it far
exceeds the level of detail of the earlier GATT case.
Another illustration is the almost 500-page panel report of December 6,
1997 on Japanese measures in Photographic Paper.2 The case was decided
in Japan's favour and against the complaint by the United States. Two aspects
are of interest in the present context. First, there is the detailed, point-by-
point, detail-by-detail examination by the panel of each of the "measures"
about which the Japanese complained. 21
As already alluded to, some of this reflects the sheer complexity of the
measures and the increasing sophistication and detail of arguments before the
panel. But this ever-increasing detail is also attributable to the evolution of
the system from a largely consensus-based and political one to a judgment
and rules-based one. The limiting effect on total freedom of manoeuver - and
on the untrammeled right of States to adopt measures deemed to be in the
best interest of their citizens - is implicit in the very detail of this examina-
tion. It is a fact of life in the post-Uruguay Round era.
Secondly, related to the issue of sovereignty, the Appellate Body has af-
firmed that a governmental policy need not necessarily have a substantially
binding or compulsory nature and that even non-binding, hortatory wording
in government statements of policy could have the same "effect on private
actors as a legally binding measure or what Japan refers to as regulatory ad-
ministrative guidance. "2 Thus, the signal by the Appellate Body that policy
statements outside the realm of government actual legislation or regulation
may be swept into consideration by future WTO panels.
18 E.C. - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), (WT/DS48/AB/R),
Jan. 16, 1998 [hereinafter Meat Hormones].
19 See Import Prices, supra note 14.
20 Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, (WT/DS44/R),
Dec. 6, 1997.
21 The essence of the U.S. case was that various internal measures, consisting of Cabinet
policy decisions, nullified and impaired anticipated benefits under Article XXIII: 1 (B) of the
GAT. The panel and the Appellate Body were unable to find specific decisions or measures
flowing from these policy decisions that directly affected U.S. rights.
22 Meat Hormones, supra note 18, at 10.49, p. 377.
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Im. WTO PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY REPORTS - EXCEPTIONS
EXTREMELY LIMrTED
Together with the impact of much closer scrutiny by GATT and WTO
panels, there has been a marked tendency by panels to construe exemptions
to GATT and WTO obligations very narrowly. The assumption is that, unless
there are overriding and compelling reasons, States cannot get around their
GATTIWTO obligations by appealing to some of the exceptions or exemp-
tions referred to in those agreements. It means that bound treaty obligations
cannot be taken lightly.
This trend toward strict interpretation of GATT obligations was evident
in the latter days "of the GATT, when panels were increasingly unimpressed
with deviations from strict treaty obligations under the pretense of an Article
XX exception. A good example is the Tuna-Dolphin case,2 in which a panel
refused to accept the right of the United States to derogate from its GATT
obligations to meet what, by objective counts, was a compelling conservation
issue. The United States had defended its prohibition on imports of Mexican
tuna under the Marine Mammal Protection Act by virtue of the Article XX
exceptions, as being "necessary" for the protection of animal life (i.e., dol-
phins) under sub-paragraph (b). Reflecting the strict approach to GATT obli-
gations:
The panel considered that the United States' measures, even if Arti-
cle XX(b) were interpreted to permit extrajurisdictional protection of
life and health, would not meet the requirements of necessity set out
in that provision. The United States had not demonstrated to the
Panel - as required by a party-invoking an Article XX exception -
that it had exhausted all options reasonably available to it to pursue
its dolphin protection objectives through measures consistent with
the General Agreement, in particular through negotiation of interna-
tional cooperative arrangements .... Moreover, even assuming that
an import prohibition were the only resort reasonably available to the
United States, the particular measure chosen by the United States
could in the panel's view not be considered to be necessary within
the meaning of Article XX(b). 24 (emphasis added)
Here, the panel was not only construing the exceptions to GATT obliga-
tions narrowly, it was also stating that the issue of "necessity" for any trade-
23 United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, (1991-92) 39S B.I.S.D. 155. While the
panel report has not been adopted, it has entered into the annals of GATT decisions as having
persuasive force in its views of the sanctity of primary GAIT obligations.
24 Id. at 199.
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restrictive measure would be assessed on the basis of objective considera-
tions. Simply asserting that the State concerned felt the measure to be "nec-
essary" was not sufficient. There had to be a demonstrable case to show that
all other reasonable options had been exhausted.
The second branch of the case by the United States in Tuna-Dolphin was
raised under Article XX(g). The United States argued that the import ban was
a measure aimed at conserving dolphin stocks and was, therefore, within the
scope of this paragraph as "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources." It was given equally short shrift by the panel. Citing a previous
GATT case on Canadian unprocessed salmon and herring restrictions, 2 the
panel said that to fit within the exception, such a measure did not only have
to "relate" to conservation, it had to be "primarily aimed at" such conserva-
tion.26 Again, this was a very high threshold and a narrow reading of the Ar-
ticle XX exceptions.
The same narrow construction of Article XX exceptions has been applied
by panels under the WTO. Re-formulated Gasoline is a good example. At
issue in this case were certain U.S. environmental regulations issued under
the Clean Air Act of 1990,28 whereby certain baseline standards for gasoline
were applied more favourably in certain cases for domestically refined gaso-
line as opposed to imported gasoline. The WTO panel had found that this
differential treatment contravened GATT obligations and was not justified
under any of the Article XX exceptions. The United States appealed.
As in the Tuna-Dolphin and Salmon and Herring cases, the key issues in
Re-formulated Gasoline were the scope of the exceptions under paragraph
(g) of Article XX and whether a technically discriminatory environmental or
conservation measure could nonetheless be saved if it were a measure "re-
lating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources." The Appellate
Body said no. It upheld the panel finding that the measure did not come
within the paragraph (g) exceptions. Even if it was a measure aimed at con-
servation, even if it was primarily aimed at conservation, it was discrimina-
tory and, for that reason alone, could not be saved. As the Appellate Body
stated:
The chapeau is animated by the principle that while the exceptions to
Article XX may be invoked as a matter of legal right, they should not
25 Canada -Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, (1998) 35S
B.I.S.D. 98 (Panel Report adopted Mar. 22, 1998).
26 Id. at 201.
27 United States - Standards for Re-formulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the
Apgellate Body, AB-1996-1, Apr. 29, 1996.
Clean Air Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1990).
[Vol. 24.121 1998
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be so applied as to frustrate the legal obligations of the holder of the
right under the substantive rules of the General Agreement.29
The chapeau to Article XX prevents any trade-restrictive measure that is dis-
criminatory, disguised or not, and cannot save a conservation measure under
virtually any circumstances. As the Appellate Body stated:
We consider that 'disguised restriction,' whatever else it covers, may
be properly read as embracing restrictions amounting to arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination in international trade taken under the
guise of a measure formally within the terms of an exception listed in
Article XX .... The fundamental theme is to be found in the pur-
pose and object of avoiding abuse of illegitimate use of the excep-
tions to the substantive rules available in Article XX.
30
What the Appellate Body is saying here is that, even if a measure fits
squarely within the Article XX exceptions, it fails under the chapeau if it is in
the least bit discriminatory. It leaves open to serious questioning whether
governments have any room to manoeuver and whether, after Tuna-Dolphin,
Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, and Re-formulated Gasoline, there is any
meaning left to the Article XX exceptions. If there is not, the ability of gov-
ernments to legislate for legitimate Article XX purposes has been removed.
The overriding dimension to these cases is the extent to which panels -
fortified by the Appellate Body - have upheld the overriding sanctity of
GATT and WTO obligations. The limitations on a State's freedom of action
are clear.
IV. NATIONAL TREATMENT
Compounding the limitations placed on the freedom of action by WTO
Members by the narrow constructions of the exceptions is the strict approach
to national treatment applied through successive GATT and WTO panel in-
terpretations. Canada ran up against the strict application of GATT obliga-
tions in the Periodicals case.
The United States took Canada to court over the excise tax Canada ap-
plied to advertising revenues earned from advertisements place in so-called
"split-run" editions of U.S. magazines. No such tax was applied to non-split-
runs, imported or domestic. At issue was whether this tax applied in a dis-
29 Id. at 22.
30 Id. at 25.
31 Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Panel Report, (WT/DS31/R),
Mar. 14, 1997; Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS31/AB/R, June 30, 1997 [hereinafter
Periodicals].
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criminatory fashion to imported U.S. split-run magazines, which would be
contrary to GATT Article III. Both the panel and the Appellate Body found
against Canada. The case has become somewhat of a cause cdlbre, given the
sensitivity of Canadians to the whole cultural issue.
The Periodicals case was, of course, argued on purely legal grounds.
Canada defended the measure as one aimed at protecting Canadian advertis-
ing revenues, not magazines per se, and hence was outside of the GATT. It
also argued that the measure applied to revenues earned on split-runs,
whether produced inside or outside of Canada, that it did not have a dispro-
portionate impact on imported magazines and that, in any case, the Canadian
market for all magazines, imported and domestic, was a fully open one.
The panel rejected the Canadian defense. Having found that the imported
magazines were the same as the domestic ones, it observed that "the only
remaining question is whether imported 'split-run' periodicals are subject to
an internal tax in excess of that applied to domestic non-'split-run' periodi-
cals. ' 32 The "only remaining question" was whether the tax applied differen-
tially to imported goods.
This is fairly tough, although entirely consistent with the strict reading
given to Article III by previous panels, such as the panel that examined the
Section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 case.33 That panel held that there
was an absolute obligation under GATT Article III to guaranty full equality
of treatment between imported and domestic goods. The overriding objective
of this requirement, the Section 337 panel held, was to ensure "effective
equality of opportunities" for imported goods vis-a-vis domestic ones.34 The
same rationale was followed scrupulously in succeeding cases in the GATT
and in the WTO, a recent example being the Japan Alcoholic Beverages
35
case.
The Periodicals case, the Section 337 case, the Japan Alcoholic Bever-
ages case and a number of other cases show the dangers governments face in
deviating from strict compliance with the GATT national treatment rule. But
it also reveals the rule's shortcomings, in that it fails to countenance any cir-
cumstances where less than full adherence to this obligation will be tolerated.
This strict approach to national treatment, in the broad sense, constrains the
ability of States to legislate and, viewed from that perspective, has an impact
on their sovereignty.
32 ld. f[ 4.27.
33 United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, (1988-89) 36S B.I.S.D. 345 (Panel
Report adopted, Nov. 7, 1989).
34 Idf5.11.
35 WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS1O/AB/R, WT/DS 1/AB/R, adopted Nov. 1, 1996.
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Thus, in the Periodicals case, the broader issue of the open access to the
Canadian market enjoyed by U.S. magazines was irrelevant to the WTO
panel's deliberation. The panel was not impressed with the extent to which
U.S. magazines had access to the Canadian market at large or the fact that
these were freely available at Canadian newsstands. The only issue, accord-
ing to the panel, was whether there was less than fully equivalent treatment
accorded to Sports Illustrated over that given to Canadian magazines.
In Re-formulated Gasoline, the same product-specific approach enunci-
ated in the Section 337 case was followed, the panel stating the words
"treatment no less favourable" in Article 1.:4:
[C]all for the effective equality of competitive opportunities for im-
ported products in respect of laws, regulations and requirements af-
fecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution and use of products. The Panel found therefore that
since, under the baseline establishment methods, imported gasoline
was effectively prevented from benefiting from as favourable sales
conditions as were afforded domestic gasoline by an individual
baseline tied to the producer of a product, imported gasoline was
• • 36
treated less favourably than domestic gasoline. (emphasis added)
The panel went on to reject the U.S. "comparability" defense that imported
gasoline was treated similarly to gasoline from similarly situated domestic
refiners, pointing out that Article ]]:4 essentially allows no variation as to
type or level of treatment or considerations beyond an assessment of the
measure at issue in light of the absolute rule of equality of treatment.
The national treatment rule is a cornerstone of international trade law. It
has, as we have seen, served the international community well in a series of
important trade cases. No one could reasonably suggest that this foundation
principle be watered down as a standard of international behaviour. This be-
ing said, maybe it is time to re-examine the rigid application of the national
treatment requirement on a product-specific basis. It was drafted fifty years
ago, under much different circumnstances, when issues were less complex.
Could there be a broader legal test, one that maintains the sanctity of national
treatment but legitimizes limited, permissible deviations from the rule, as-
sessed by looking at the broader market picture for that product in the im-
porting country?
A possible approach would be for panels to apply the "effective equality
of competitive opportunities" against the market at large, as opposed to the
effect of a given measure on dn individual product. This would mean that
36 Re-formulated Gasoline, supra note 27, at f 6.10.
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effective equality of competitive opportunities would not necessarily entail
exact equality in all cases. The extent of commercial opportunity to compete
in the import market, and not simply the effect of a measure on the imported
product per se, would be the issue.
This implies a change in the technical, product-based application of
GATT Article mII to the application of broader criteria. It would not be a re-
trenchment from the primary rule of non-discriminatory treatment. It would,
however, allow measures to be defended by States demonstrating the overall
ability of a given product to contest that the import market was not materially
impaired.
If these "contestability" criteria had been available in the Periodicals
case, they might have allowed Canada to defend its excise tax measures by
showing that, notwithstanding the more favourable treatment accorded Cana-
dian periodicals, the measure was sustainable because foreign (that is, U.S.)
periodicals were not materially prevented from competing in (or "contest-
ing") the Canadian market and, in fact, enjoyed wide success in that market.
The same defense would have permitted the United States to demonstrate
that imported reformulated gasoline was not denied effective market partici-
pation, notwithstanding the difference in technical baseline standards.
There is, of course, some heresy in this proposal. Often overlooked in the
zealous pursuit of national treatment is that it was designed, first and fore-
most, to maintain open markets, allow the forces of comparative advantage
free play, and prevent distortions through discriminatory national laws and
policies. The underlying WTO theory, like the GATT before it, is market-
based.
Is there not some room for manoeuvering? Can governments not depart
from strict non-discrimination obligations on a product-by-product basis by
showing that their markets for that product remain open and freely contest-
able? This would be a way of addressing legitimate, national policy objec-
tives without weakening one of the main pillars of the global trading system.
V. DISPUTE SETrLEMENT WITH PRIVATE PARTIES
Prior to the NAFTA, direct litigation between persons and States was a
rarity. Consensual facilities had been developed through international agree-
ment for the resolution of these kinds of disputes. Some of these agreements
were of a purely commercial nature as part of lex mercatoria, such as the
arbitration facilities of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. At
the level of public international law, under the auspices of the World Bank,
the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes be-
[Vol. 24.121 1998
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tween States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID) 7 provides for agree-
ments to be settled by third-party arbitration. Bilateral foreign investment
agreements followed the same pattern. However, the hallmark of these bilat-
eral mechanisms and the ICSID was that a pre-existing compromis or arbi-
tration agreement had to be in place.
38
The NAFTA broke new ground in this area. Chapter 11 provides that, in
any such investment dispute, any person can bring action directly against a
NAFTA host government, whether there is a prior arbitration agreement or
not.39 Thus, NAFTA Article 1116 provides that an investor may submit to
binding arbitration a claim that a NAFTA state has breached its obligations
under the investment protection obligations of Chapter 11 whether or not
there is a prior arbitration agreement in place.
Those Chapter 11 obligations are broad in scope. They include the obli-
gation to provide national and most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment and
the obligation to ensure treatment in accordance with international law, in-
cluding "fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security."40 To-
gether with these general requirements, NAFTA Article 1110 provides that,
"No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment
of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such investment,, 41 except for a public
purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with due process of
law, and on payment of prompt and fair market value payment. These Chap-
ter 11 provisions followed largely from Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
that Canada and the United States had concluded with other governments and
those established the treatment standard in this respect. The overriding dif-
ference, of course, was that these bilateral treaties left it to the governments
to arbitrate any alleged failure to comply with treaty requirements. They did
not provide a direct right to investors themselves to litigate.
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA went largely unnoticed for several years, with
little controversy over what appeared to be a fairly straightforward applica-
37 See supra note 9.
38 Under Article 25 of the ICSID, the jurisdiction of the Centre extends to any legal
dispute arising directly out of an investment between a Contracting State and an investor
"which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre."
39 See Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive
Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAw. 727 (1993).
40 NAFTA Chapter 11 has been incorporated into the Energy Charter Treaty, Lisbon, Dec.
17, 1994, and applies in the case of energy-related disputes between a host-State and an
investor. See Lawrence L. Herman, NAFTA and the ECT: Divergent Approaches with a Core
of Harmony, (1997) 15 J.ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L 129 (1997).; THE ENERGY
CHARTER TREATY: AN EAST-WEsT GATEWAY FOR INVESTMENT AND TRADE (Thomas WdJde
ed, Kuwer 1996).
41 NAFTA, art. 1110.
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tion of acceptable international standards of treatment to the realm of private
rights. Aside from two disputes - one of which has been moving steadily
through the system - little was heard in Canada of Chapter 11 until the
OECD negotiations on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)
began to gather momentum in the spring and summer of 1997.
The MAI is an effort on the part of the OECD members to conclude a
high-standard investment agreement that will set rules and standards for host-
State behaviour. It is only in draft form, and the negotiations are set to pro-
ceed in the spring of 1998 to see if a final agreement can be achieved. 42 The
framework of the successive OECD drafts have followed NAFTA Chapter
11, including the investor-State provisions on dispute settlement.
The MAI, and in particular the investor-State provisions, has now be-
come the centrepiece of an intense public debate in Canada. The claim made
by detractors of the MAI is that the various draft provisions represent a dan-
gerous diminution of sovereignty on the one hand, and the conferring of in-
ordinately extensive rights on large international corporations and multina-
tional enterprises on the other. Singled out, but not alone in this opprobrium,
are the provisions in investor-State dispute settlement. These provisions fol-
low the NAFTA framework and provide that an investor can seek binding
and enforceable arbitration in any dispute "concerning an alleged breach of43
an obligation" of the host-State under the Agreement.
The claim is made that these provisions will provide foreign corporations
with the freedom to challenge virtually any legitimate domestic law, regula-
tion, or policy on the basis that such measure is tantamount to or, in the
words of the MAI draft test, has "equivalent effect" to nationalization or ex-
propriation.
The basis for such a challenge under the MAI, it should be noted, would
not be that there was an element of discrimination or a failure to accord na-
tional treatment to that foreign investment, but simply that the value of an
asset has been negatively affected by such a measure and that this is, or can
be, of "equivalent effect" to nationalization or expropriation. This, it is fur-
42 While there had been a degree of momentum to conclude negotiations in the spring of
1998 and to open up the agreement for signature among OECD and non-OECD members,
there remain many unsettled issues, including the need to effect some sort of arrangement on
the U.S Helms-Burton legislation. Together with this, the U.S. government has recently
expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in other areas and has expressed concern
with the insistence by many participants on reservations or exceptions to the MAI provisions.
The U.S. position is that there is not enough on the negotiating table to make a deal possible,
and further progress is needed.
43 Draft MAI text, DAFFE/MAI/NM(97)2, Part V, D.2.
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ther argued, represents one of the greatest threats to governments' abilities to
govern and, thus, is a threat to State sovereignty.44
As a case in point, critics in Canada have referred to the current pro-
ceedings initiated by the Ethyl Corporation in the United States under
NAFTA Chapter 11. 5 The case concerns the prohibition enacted by the fed
eral government (Bill C-29) over the importation of and inter-provincial
trade in a gasoline additive known as MMT. 46 The rationale for the ban is
that the substance is environmentally harmful and is a health hazard. Ethyl
claims that, among other matters, this is a measure "tantamount to" expro-
priation, since it has effectively reduced the value of its Canadian distribution
assets to zero. The case has been used to underscore the possibility of a range
of national, "sovereign" measures likewise being subjected to binding arbi-
tration.
Opposition to the MAI appears rampant among not only Canadian inter-
est groups, but in the United States, a coalition of U.S. environmental groups
have launched a campaign to defeat the MAI, claiming, like their Canadian
counterparts, that it will make foreign corporations into "super citizens,"
enjoying rights that ordinary American citizens do not have.47 Non-
governmental organizations such as Greenpeace International strongly op-
pose the MAI for fear that it will limit State sovereignty in dealing with a
range of environmental, social, and human health and safety measures.48
The issues raised in Canada, the United States, and elsewhere concern the
issue of sovereignty and international dispute resolution, bringing what was
seen as a fairly technical legal issue to the forefront of policy debate. Can
there be a mechanism where foreign persons bring actions directly against
governments that does not, somehow, have a theoretical limitation on the
44 There is nothing in the draft text or in the commentary that clarifies what is meant by
the draft wording "having equivalent effect," other than that it is intended to cover, among
other things, "creeping expropriation." Id. at 122.
45 See Groups See Danger from Ethyl Suit, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 1248 (July 16,1997).
46 Ethyl imports MMT, a gasoline additive, into Canada and distributes it to refiners for
blending with gasoline. MMT has not been accepted for use in the United States due to a ban
imposed by the EPA, although this is currently under litigation.
4 See U.S. Environmental Groups Announce Campaign to Defeat OECD Investment
Pact, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. 263 (Feb. 18, 1998). NGOs have been relentless in their quest
against the MAI. The issues have become highly politicized. A recent speech by the GATT
Director-General contained a mere suggestion that the WTO might be prepared to look at the
MAI once the OECD negotiations concluded. This comment was taken out of context by a
number of special interest groups who claimed that the WTO Director-General was
associating the WVTO with the MAI exercise. He was forced to issue an unprecedented press
release denying any such linkage. WTO Denies Claims by Special Interest Groups Linking
Rugiero to MAI, Press/91 Feb. 17, 1998.
Global Investment Pact on Ropes: Opponents Cheer Faltering Pact, GLOBE & MAIL,
Mar. 27, 1998.
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sovereign power of the State? Is it objectionable to provide for foreign per-
sons to have the right to litigate, where nationals do not? Are there over-
arching dangers here that lawyers and negotiators have not foreseen?
Given the intense controversy surrounding the MAI and the investor-
State provisions in particular, it may be necessary to calmly consider these
criticisms and re-think the rationale behind these provisions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
There are many unanswered questions about international dispute settle-
ment in the trade area and its longer-term effect on national sovereignty.
Oddly, in some bizarre twist, the debate has put some parties that would ap-
pear to share little common ideological ground on the same side of the argu-
ment. In the United States, for example, conservative opponents of the
NAFTA, and of international dispute settlement generally, are sharing the
podium with environmental and other interest groups that oppose the MAI.
One would think the latter would be in favour of international engagement by
the United States and of the progressive development of international law
through enhanced settlement processes and procedures, but such is not the
case.
Insofar as the MAI is concerned, the notion that allowing private parties
the right to sue governments will create "super citizens" seems over-drawn.
And yet, there is some nagging doubt that the issues here cannot be easily
dismissed. One solution would be to draft into the MAI a series of safeguard
provisions, like those in the 1994 GATT, which set down interpretative notes
to make it clear that investment measures that can be challenged must in-
volve an element of "taking" or of confiscation and that mere changes to
laws, regulations, or policies that have a direct or indirect effect on the value
of an asset are not sufficient. Another may be to abandon the notion of in-
vestor-State dispute settlement and return to the more traditional means of
dispute settlement. That would mean that any such investment dispute would
be arbitrated between governments only.
Insofar as the WTO is concerned, there is no likelihood that the trend will
change. Aided by a more rapid and effective system of dispute resolution,
States are turning more and more to the DSU process to deal with unresolved
differences. Together with this, governments are more diligently preparing
cases and are presenting exhaustive pleadings and arguments. The panels,
particularly the specialized Appellate Body, have much better factual bases
for their decision-making and are more versed in trade law then ever before.
This combination of factors means that national measures will increasingly
come under challenge and international scrutiny. It is part of globalization
from which no government can escape.
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There are no easy answers to these questions for lawyers. The challenges
are there. They will continue to bedevil legislators. The strict application of
trade obligations and the newly found ability of persons, possibly, to chal-
lenge State measures has brought new and daunting issues to the forefront.
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